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Abstract: 
We find and describe four futures markets where the bid-ask spread is bid down to the fixed 
price tick size practically all the time, and which match counterparties using a pro-rata rule. 
These four markets' offered depths at the quotes on average exceed mean market order size by 
two orders of magnitude, and their order cancellation rates (the probability of any given 
offered lot being cancelled) are significantly over 96 per cent. We develop a simple 
theoretical model to ex- plain these facts, where strategic complementarities in the choice of 
limit order size cause traders to risk overtrading by submitting over-sized limit orders, most of 
which they expect to cancel. 
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 1 Introduction
This paper ¯nds and studies one-tick futures markets, where the price tick size is large
and normally equal to the bid-ask spread. It begins by observing over a large majority
(by value traded electronically) of all futures markets, the positive relationship noted
in Harris (1994) and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), and predicted in Large (2007),
between tick size and o®ered depths at the best quotes. It then concentrates on a subset
of markets exhibiting this relationship in an extreme form, with very high depths at the
best quotes, together with spreads which are scarcely ever wider than the price tick size.
The four most accentuated cases (in depth terms) turned out to be the leading short-
term interest rate (STIR) futures markets in the US (Eurodollar), Europe (Euribor) and
the UK (Short Sterling), together with the two-year US Treasury Note future. These four
outlier markets had an interesting commonality: they all matched orders on a pro-rata
basis, rather than on the more common price-time basis. We report unusual features of
trading dynamics on these one-tick pro-rata markets, and develop a simple theoretical
model to explain these.
In all four of our example one-tick pro-rata cases, the bid-ask spread is larger than
the price tick size only infrequently: signi¯cantly less that 3 per cent of the time. Total
average depths, adding together both the best bid and the best ask, exceed the mean
market order size by multiples of over 170, and rise to a multiple of 600 in the case of
Short Sterling. Furthermore, on all four markets the probability that any given o®ered
lot is withdrawn before it trades approaches certainty: it is signi¯cantly greater than 96
per cent (and exceeds 98 per cent on Eurodollar and Euribor).
To explain these ¯ndings we develop a theoretical model which predicts great inside
depths and cancellation rates in equilibrium because of the pro-rata matching algorithm.
The pro-rata algorithm matches limit orders to each countervailing market order in
proportion (pro-rata) to their sizes; this `rations' the market order out, as it is typically
too small to trade with them all in their entirety, in a manner reminiscent of book-
building on primary equity markets.1
1Section 3.3 gives a full account of the pro-rata rule.
2In our model this creates strategic complementarities in the quantity decisions of
liquidity suppliers.2 Therefore, when faced with one another's limit orders, traders'
equilibrium strategy is to submit bids and asks of greater size than the quantity that
they wish to trade. As they over-o®er, liquidity suppliers accept a risk of overtrading.
We show that such overtrading risk is an important factor in forestalling an unending
order-size `arms race', where ever larger limit orders are submitted. Indeed, substantial
overtrading risk ensures the existence of equilibrium. However, if such overtrading risk
is relatively weak and/or if traders are numerous, then over-o®ering can be of large
magnitude.
This helps to explain the high cancellation rates in our data: over-o®ering limit order
submitters often meet their trading objectives while parts of their limit orders remain
un¯lled (i.e. unexecuted). These parts can then be cancelled, and may constitute a large
majority of the volume that was initially o®ered for trade.
To assess the extent of overtrading risk we study quantiles of the distribution of
market order sizes across the four identi¯ed one-tick pro-rata markets. We ¯nd that the
distributions have a fairly long upper tail. On all four markets, their upper 1 percentile
exceeds the mean by more than ten times. Given the pro-rata rule, this implies that,
when a market sale (purchase) arrives at a deep book, there is probability greater than
1 per cent that it is so large as to cause all bids (asks) at the quotes to execute a
size that exceeds expectations by a factor of over 10. While signi¯cant, this is not an
overwhelming tail, which may help to explain the large extent of over-o®ering on these
markets.
So some of the e®ects on liquidity supply due to the costs of waiting to trade (see
Foucault 1999, Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel 2005) or to execution uncertainty (see
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb 1981) appear to take novel forms in one-tick
pro-rata markets, because of the large price tick size and the pro-rata matching rule.
In particular, it seems that to reduce the cost of waiting, limit order submitters bear
over-execution uncertainty.
2For a comprehensive review of strategic complementarities, see Cooper (1999), see also Cooper and
John (1988) and Vives (1990).
3Important antecedents to this work are in Bernhardt and Hughson (1996), Kadan
(2006) and Seppi (1997), which present theories of tick size, inside depths (i.e. depths at
the best quotes) and welfare in dealer and hybrid markets. Consequences of discreteness
for bias in volatility estimation are treated in Ball (1988), Gottlieb and Kalay (1985)
and Harris (1990). Ways of overcoming such bias are discussed in Delattre and Jacod
(1997), Oomen (2006), Zeng (2003) and Large (2005). To our knowledge, there are
not yet empirical market microstructure studies in the literature of cases where bid-ask
spreads scarcely ever di®er from the tick size, although there are theoretical analyses in
Parlour (1998) and Large (2007).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 observes a wide range of futures markets and
identi¯es a subset with the market microstructure that interests us. These markets are
analyzed in some detail Section 3, in order to establish the empirical properties around
cancellations, depths and spreads outlined in the Introduction. Section 4 presents a
simple theoretical model to account for these ¯ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Search for one-tick pro-rata markets
We begin our analysis by identifying 100 underlying instruments with liquid futures con-
tracts, such as physical commodities, ¯nancial assets or indices. In initial investigations,
we studied a period from 23 November to 11 December 2006. However, to reduce risks of
over-¯tting, following Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) we select a fresh period to report
our results. We ¯nd little change. This period is from 16th to 20th April 2007.
Futures contracts (futures) on a given instrument are available at multiple delivery
dates (normally at spacings of a month or a quarter), and each such future is traded and
cleared separately, with its own market microstructure. For each of the 100 instruments
we select the most actively traded delivery date over our observed period. For this
purpose we proxy market activity by the number of changes to depths or prices at the
best quotes on the electronic limit order book per minute, calling this measure `updates
per minute'. We con¯ne our attention to trading on limit order books, rather than on
trading °oors or pits.
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Figure 1: A chart plotting the 40 observed futures markets. Those markets of greatest
interest to us are labeled. One observation fell below the x-axis, at coordinates (94%,0.7).
Of these 100 electronic limit order books, 40 had on average more than 10 updates per
minute. Since our interest is in fairly liquid markets, we select these for closer analysis.3
The retained set of 40 markets comprises six currency futures, nine government bond
futures, three short-term interest rate futures (STIRs), twenty stock index futures from
12 countries (including `E-mini' products), and two commodity futures.
Based on a simple criterion regarding deviation from median daily prices, outliers in
our data were censored.4 Each market was observed continuously between an appropriate
¯xed start and end time of day, so as to include more than 90 per cent of o±cial opening
hours on its primary °oor exchange. Table 1 documents our observation start and end
times for eight markets of particular interest.
Figure 1 plots the 40 retained futures markets along two central dimension for this
study. On the vertical axis it shows the average of the mean depth at the best bid and
the mean depth at the best ask, when divided by the average trade size: in brief, the
3The busiest market in this subsample had on average 484 updates per minute.
4Applied to cases where prices were greater than 25% away from the daily mid. Instances of crossed
markets, where the price of the best bid exceeded the best ask, were also excluded.
5`average inside depth / average trade size'.5 To catch the substantial disparity between
markets, a logarithmic scale is used. On the horizontal axis is shown the proportion of
the time that the bid-ask spread exceeds the price tick size.
Figure 1 indicates that high depths at the quotes are associated with bid-ask spreads
near the price tick size, a relationship that was investigated in Harris (1994) and Gold-
stein and Kavajecz (2000). For our purposes the most interesting part of the chart is its
top-left corner, where inside depths are very high and the bid-ask spread infrequently
exceeds the price tick.
Among the 40 markets, the four deepest (on the measure reported in Figure 1)
comprise the two-year US Treasury Note future (labeled TN2 in the graph), together
with the three short-term interest rate futures (STIRs): Short Sterling (SS), Euribor
(EU), and Eurodollar (ED). STIR futures contracts are distinctive because they operate
on a cash-settlement basis with no underlying traded security. An Appendix explains
how they are created and administered.
These four markets match orders using a pro-rata matching algorithm. As they
have bid-ask spreads which equaled one price tick more than 96 per cent of the time
(a statement we will later make statistically rigorous), we term them one-tick pro-rata
markets. We select them for more detailed analysis.
The next four deepest markets are the Nikkei (Osaka) stock index future (NK), the
5-year and 10-Year US Treasury Note futures (TN5 and TN), and the US Treasury Bill
future (TB). These markets operate on a price-time basis. While they are not therefore
in our main focus, we provide data on their microstructure as well. All eight mentioned
markets had average depths at the best bid (ask) which exceed the average trade size
by a factor of more than 30. They all experience on average more than 80 updates per
minute.
5This statistic is half of the related statistic quoted in the Introduction, which regarded the bid and
ask depths added together.
6Eurodollar  Euribor 
 Short 
Sterling 
 2yr T-
Notes 
 5yr T-
Notes 
 10yr T-
Notes   T-Bills  Nikkei 
Exchange CME LIFFE LIFFE CBOT CBOT CBOT CBOT Osaka
Market organization
Start of observation (GMT) 14:00 08:00 08:00 13:30 13:30 13:30 13:30 01:12
End of observation (GMT) 19:30 15:54 15:51 19:45 19:45 19:45 19:45 07:00
Updates per minute 308        161        101        213      472       355       339        86       
Market orders per hour 299        259        335        270      648       1,409    925        1,500  
Mean depth at best bid (lots) 12,162   6,811     19,573   5,172   4,801    3,019    1,706     422     
standard error 963        690       3,930     365      316      150       94         83      
Mean depth at best ask (lots) 10,595   7,518     18,805   5,418   4,485    2,810    1,664     425     
standard error 543        692       2,239     562      330      157       94         87      
Mean market order size (lots) 76          28          46          61        73         77         40          10       
standard error 2.8         1.1        2.0         3.6       1.6       1.1        0.7        0.2     
Upper 1% quantile, trade size 873        300        805        750      750       1,000    426        135     
when divided by the mean 11.5       10.8      17.6       12.2     10.3     13.0      10.6      13.8   
Mean size of limit bids (lots) 157        189        227        133      43         40         22          9         
standard error 1.7         3.8        5.0         2.4       0.2       0.3        0.1        0.2     
Mean size of limit asks (lots) 163        172        239        136      40         38         22          10       
standard error 1.7         3.4        5.6         2.6       0.2       0.2        0.1        0.3     
Propn. of time that the bid-ask 
spread is the price tick size 99.1% 97.8% 98.6% 98.2% 99.7% 99.7% 99.8% 92.7%
Price Tick Size 0.005 0.005 0.01 0.0078 0.0156 0.0156 0.0312 10       
Proportion of offered lots that 
are cancelled at the quotes 98.2% 98.9% 97.4% 97.3% 90.7% 76.5% 84.2% 44.2%
standard error 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 2.8%
pro-rata price-time
Table 1: Summary information about four short-term interest rate futures markets.
3 One-tick pro-rata market microstructure
This section studies the market microstructure of the one-tick pro-rata markets in more
detail. They are the two-year US Treasury Note future, and Short Sterling, Euribor,
Eurodollar and 2-Year US Treasury Note futures. Formal inference is done to establish
con¯dence bounds for the statistics on the vertical and horizontal axes of Figure 1, and
the scope is widened to include their cancellation rates and their depth distributions.
Table 1 provides summary data about the four one-tick pro-rata markets. In gener-
ating this data we observe every change in the prices and depths of the limit order book
7at the best quotes, as well as the time of that change, to the nearest second. We do not
use data about the shape of the limit order book outside the best quotes.6
3.1 Inside depths, and their comparison with market order size
Table 1 reports the average depth observed at the best bid, and that at the best ask. In
italics below these averages is shown a standard error. Both bid and ask depths range
from about 5,000 lots in the case of 2-Year US Treasury Note futures to over 19,000 lots
in the case of Short Sterling (the unit of quantity here is the `lot').7
The ¯gures are based on sampling the data periodically, rather than at every available
fresh observation of depth. This accommodates a procedure to estimate standard errors.
Speci¯cally, the observed period is broken into a large number of successive durations: 50
for each trading day.8 Rather than sampling the data at evenly spaced times, we prefer
to sample in business time, see Oomen (2006) and Hansen and Lunde (2006). This
controls for intraday seasonal and other °uctuations in market activity and volatility.
To proxy for the passing of business time, we observe the rate at which fresh limit
orders are added at the quotes. The successive durations of time are chosen to contain
(as closely as possible subject to rounding limitations) equal numbers of newly arrived
lots o®ered for trade at the quotes.
Inside depths were observed at the start of each duration. On the assumption that
once sampled in business time the resulting time series of inside depths is stationary,
standard errors may be constructed for the mean observation, using the well-known
technique due to Newey and West (1987). This is done with 24 lags. To compare with
this, the average size of all market orders was found, and Newey-West standard errors
were again calculated with 24 lags. Average inside depths dramatically exceed average
market order size.
Figures 3 and 4 present time-weighted histograms of the inside depths observed on,
respectively, the four one-tick pro-rata markets of principal interest in this study, and the
6Although we do not study prices outside of the best quotes, informal investigation of the one-tick
pro-rata markets indicates that the limit order book is in fact typically almost empty outside the quotes.
7See Table 2.
8Alternative values to 50 were evaluated, and results are similar.
8four one-tick price-time markets described in Table 1. The eight histograms have similar
features within each group of four, but di®er markedly across groups. These markets are
all one-tick markets with large inside depths. However, within this set, there is a clear
di®erence in the inside depth distributions between the pro-rata and price-time priority
markets.
While the four one-tick price-time markets in Figure 4 exhibit a single, pronounced,
mode near to the mean, Figure 3 tells a di®erent story. The one-tick pro-rata markets
in Figure 3 all have modes that are greatly exceeded by the mean and long upper tails,
indicating high variability in o®ered depths.
3.2 The propensity of o®ered lots to be cancelled
Market participants are informed whenever an o®er to trade ceases to be available to
them. Such events also appear in our data, as reductions in o®ered depths. There
are two possible causes of such a reduction: either some outstanding bids or asks are
cancelled, or they successfully execute during a transaction. However, the two causes
cannot be distinguished by market participants, or in our data.
Nevertheless, because we observe frequently-updated (but, by a few seconds, slightly
delayed) trading volume data we can calculate the proportion of such depth reductions
at the quotes, that were due to cancellation rather than to trades. We call this the
cancellation rate. It is given by
cancellation rate = 1 ¡
trading volume in lots
number of o®ered lots removed at the best quotes
: (1)
Under assumptions, the cancellation rate is interpretable as the empirical probability
that a lot is cancelled before it trades. The assumptions are as follows: a) we assume
conservatively that no lots are cancelled at stale prices outside the quotes. Because these
markets are deep at the quotes, we also assume that b) no lots are traded against, while
outside the quotes. Once a lot has been o®ered for trade on the exchange, it has one of
two fates: either it is traded, or it is cancelled. Under assumptions a) and b) it can only
trade or be cancelled while priced at the quotes. This implies that the cancellation rate
is the empirical frequency with which o®ered lots are cancelled.
9To do inference on the size of the cancellation rate, we calculate it repeatedly and
separately for each period in the set of consecutive, irregular-length periods that were
used to sample inside depths, and then take the average. Newey-West standard errors
for this average are provided (with 24 lags), on the assumption that this sequence of
cancellation rates is a stationary time series.
Table 1 indicates that on all of the four one-tick pro-rata markets, cancellation rates
exceeded 96 per cent at a (one-sided) con¯dence level of 0.05.
3.3 The pro-rata matching algorithm
The next Section will o®er an explanation for such high cancellation rates and depths
which appeals to the pro-rata matching algorithm. The pro-rata algorithm di®ers im-
portantly from the price-time algorithm used widely on equity and other markets. Both
on pro-rata and on price-time markets, the sequence in which limit orders execute is
determined according to price priority. However, evidently price priority must be sup-
plemented by a further criterion to allocate counterparties among limit orders that are
equally priced.
Unlike on a price-time market, on a pro-rata market all limit orders at the same
price trade simultaneously against each countervailing market order. The market order
is typically too small to trade with them all in their entirety. So, the trade is shared
among the limit orders in proportion to their sizes. For example, suppose that traders
A and B have both submitted limit asks at the best ask, whose price is $10. A o®ers
100 lots for sale, while B o®ers 50 lots. If a counterparty buys three lots at $10, then
the order matching algorithm breaks this purchase into two parts, allocates a trade of
two lots to trader A, and one lot to trader B.
There are some further details of lesser importance: additional rules are needed to
distribute `odd lots' arising due to quantity discreteness; and `bid-up' orders have special
rights. An Appendix explains these terms and gives a precise account of the pro-rata
algorithm, as well as some further examples, as implemented by Euronext.li®e.
Some exchange o±cials rationalize using the pro-rata algorithm by arguing that it
encourages liquidity supply on markets with low volatility, such as short-term interest
10rate futures (STIRs).
4 A model of over-o®ering
The previous section described four markets where
1. The order-matching rule is pro-rata,
2. the bid-ask spread is infrequently greater than the price tick size,
3. inside depths are some orders of magnitude greater than typical trade sizes, and
4. most lots o®ered for trade at the best quotes, in the form of limit orders, are
withdrawn before they actually trade.
This section presents a simple theoretical model of equilibrium behaviour to explain
the latter two of these stylized facts (3 and 4), while taking as given the former two (1
and 2).
4.1 Model intuition
For concreteness, this part develops some of the intuitions that this model will for-
malize. The model is speci¯ed in the next section, and then equilibrium behaviour is
characterized.
We have observed that inside depths can be of larger order of magnitude than the
average trade size. For example, on the Short Sterling future, average inside depths at
the bid (ask) exceed the average trade size by more than 400 times. Assuming that the
quantity per transaction intended by a limit order submitter is of similar magnitude to
the average trade size, it is therefore of smaller order of magnitude than average inside
depths.
The pro-rata rule distributes each market order among all available counterparty
limit orders at the best price in quantities proportional to their sizes. Therefore in
the Short Sterling example a `truth-telling' limit order of quantity equal to the average
trade size, submitted when inside depths are near the mean, executes in expectation
11only 1/400 of its volume with each market order (and adverse rounding rules detailed
in the Appendix may make that proportion even lower). By contrast, a limit order of
much larger size may execute a more satisfactory quantity for its submitter.
Consequently, traders may have incentives to submit limit orders of larger quantity
than their true trading intention, when market depths are large. This can create esca-
lating feedback in o®ered depths. Furthermore, because traders are o®ering more than
they intend to trade, they may have a higher propensity to cancel their limit orders once
they have achieved their trading objectives.
To assess this line of reasoning, we now study equilibrium depths in a theoretical
model.
4.2 Model speci¯cation
There are exactly n traders who wish to sell a future, or some other asset, which is traded
on a limit order book. Because the price tick is large, the bid-ask spread is also large, so
these traders submit asks, rather than selling cheaply with a market sale. Furthermore
the best ask, which is the upper limit of the bid-ask spread, is e®ectively ¯xed for the
duration of the game.
Traders each hold an identical inventory in the asset, so that each of them would
ideally desire to sell S¤ units at the prevailing best ask price. Because of uncertainty, they
cannot be sure to trade S¤: rather, they trade a di®erent amount which is determined
in equilibrium: call the amount that trader i actually does trade fi. For simplicity let
traders have symmetric, quadratic loss, so that trader i seeks to minimize
E[(fi ¡ S
¤)
2]: (2)
Each of the n traders has one decision to take: trader i must choose a quantity Qi to o®er
for sale at the best ask. Because it is clear and simple, we will consider a simultaneous
game where all quantity decisions are taken at the same moment.
Then one market purchase arrives and trades with one or more of the submitted asks.
Its size, M, is determined by nature as the realization of a random variable of known
distribution. After that, all remaining limit orders in the market are cancelled and the
12game ends. Thus, trader i cancels a limit order of size (Qi ¡ fi), which is the number
of units of the asset that she o®ers for sale, less the part of that amount that actually
executed (i.e. ¯lled).
Write
D =
n X
i=1
Qi:
So, D is the o®ered inside depth at the best ask which is available for trade with the
market purchase of size M.
Assume that M may be greater than S¤. Leaving aside issues of quantity discrete-
ness and consequent rounding, the pro-rata rule states that a total traded quantity of
min(M;D) is divided between agents fi = 1;:::;ng in the ratio fQ1 : Q2 : ::: : Qng. Thus
fi, the amount that agent i trades, is
fi =
Qi
D
min(M;D): (3)
Write Q¡i for the sum of the quantities chosen by the agents other than agent i, so
that D = (Qi + Q¡i). Making fi's dependence on Qi and Q¡i explicit, we may write
fi(Qi;Q¡i) = min
µ
QiM
Qi + Q¡i
;Qi
¶
: (4)
Comment It is possible that the random size of the market order, M, exceeds the
available inside depth at the best ask, D. In such cases we leave undetermined the
question, what happens to the remaining part of the market order, of size (M ¡D) lots:
the model is invariant whether it is cancelled automatically, or the market order `walks
the book' ¯nding unmodeled asks at higher prices than the best ask to trade with.
De¯nition 1 Let ^ Q be the best response function, so that ^ Q(Q¡i) minimizes expected
loss, (2), conditional on Q¡i as given by (4).
Because there is a concave loss function, taking First Order Conditions we have that if
Qi = ^ Q(Q¡i) then
E
·
2(fi ¡ S
¤)
@fi
@Qi
¸
= 0: (5)
13De¯nition 2 (equilibrium) In equilibrium, for all i · n, player i selects
Qi = ^ Q(Q¡i):
Therefore, Q¡i = (n ¡ 1)Qi.
4.3 Model analysis and equilibrium characterization
If Q¡i = 0, then, from (4), fi = min(M;Qi). Consequently, it is best for a trader to
select Qi = S¤. This observation gives the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Faced with Q¡i = 0, it is optimal for a trader to be truth-telling, so that:
^ Q(0) = S
¤: (6)
So if only trader i is supplying liquidity at the best ask, she is happy to submit an ask
of truth-telling size S¤. Matters are however otherwise if competing traders are present:
Proposition 4.2 This game exhibits strategic complementarities, whereby the best
response function is increasing:
@ ^ Q(Q¡i)
@Q¡i
> 0: (7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.2 formalizes the principle that when facing great depth at the ask (bid),
an asker (bidder) has an incentive to increase the size of her limit order. Because of
Lemma 4.1, this entails over-o®ering, by o®ering a larger limit order than the quantity,
S¤, which is really desired. A typical best response function of this form is illustrated
in Figure 2.
De¯nition 3 (substantial overtrading risk) The market has substantial over-
trading risk if for x > 1,
Pr[M > x] =
1
x®;
with ® 2 (0;1), so that M has a fat upper tail.
14So, substantial overtrading risk is modeled by giving M a well-known distribution with
a fat upper tail (it may well be that this condition could be weakened). This places a
lower bound on the danger of overtrading which arises from over-o®ering. The following
Lemma infers a resulting condition, which Proposition 4.4 uses to deduce equilibrium
existence.
Lemma 4.3 Suppose that the market has substantial overtrading risk. Then the elas-
ticity of ^ Q with respect to Q¡i is less than unity:
@ ^ Q
@Q¡i
<
^ Q
Q¡i
; so that
@ log ^ Q
@ logQ¡i
< 1: (8)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.4 Suppose that the market has substantial overtrading risk. Then a
unique equilibrium exists which is symmetric.
Proof. We noted that equilibrium has the property that Q¡i = (n ¡ 1)Qi. Figure
2 shows the monotonic increasing best response function intersecting with the line of
gradient 1 : (n ¡ 1). From Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.3,
0 <
@ log ^ Q(Q¡i)
@ logQ¡i
< 1: (9)
It follows from this that such intersection always exists and is unique. This point of
intersection describes the unique and symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4.5 As the number of players, n, increases, the equilibrium degree by which
each player over-o®ers rises, as does the amount of overtrading.
Proof. Note that the function ^ Q(¢) is invariant to n. From Lemma 4.3 it is monotonic
increasing. Therefore its intersection with the line of gradient 1 : (n ¡ 1), depicted in
Figure 2, rises as n increases, resulting in an equilibrium where each trader over-o®ers
more, and risks a greater overtrade.
So strategic interaction among competing limit order suppliers may create escalating
feedback in limit order size and depths, which can explain the very high o®ered depths
that we observe. The next Proposition outlines a further consequence: large cancellation
rates.
15Qi gradient of
1 : (n - 1)
Q-i
best response
0
S*
equilibrium
Figure 2: Illustration of equilibrium in the pro-rata market game.
Proposition 4.6 As the number of players, n, increases, the equilibrium amount that
each trader cancels increases, in the sense of ¯rst order stochastic dominance.
Proof. Player i cancels a quantity max(Qi ¡ fi;0). In symmetric equilibrium this is
max
¡
Qi ¡ M
n ;0
¢
. However, by Lemma 4.3
¡
Qi ¡ M
n ;0
¢
is increasing in n.
In the model, once a bid or ask has attracted the intended volume of trade, its
remainder is cancelled. Order cancellation becomes greater when there are many limit
order suppliers because of two e®ects: as the number of players n rises, ¯rst player
i's limit order executes with a smaller proportion of the market order; and second each
player is inclined to o®er a greater quantity for trade, more of which is therefore cancelled
in the event of no trade.
4.4 Over-execution risk and large market orders
The model identi¯es substantial overtrading risk as the element which causes depths
on one-tick pro-rata markets to be bounded. This can be explicated in the following
way: as Copeland and Galai (1983) notes, submitting a limit order gives a free trading
option to other market participants. Whenever this order is of great size, then the option
granted to the market is great. If we observe in the data that very large market orders
16are placed, exercising this option, then o®ering such an option has a cost which can
deter the submission of very large limit orders: bounding depth. It is therefore helpful
to check that in our data we see evidence of overtrading risk.
To gather evidence of overtrading risk on the four one-tick pro-rata markets, Table
1 reports the upper 0.01 quantile of their trade size distributions. This exceeded the
mean size by a factor of between 10.8 (in the case of Euribor) and 17.6 (in the case
of Short Sterling). When a market purchase arrives that is 17.6 times larger than the
expectation, and asks at the quote are over-o®ering by at least 17.6 times, then those
asks over-execute relative to (unconditional) expectations by a potentially unwelcome
factor of 17.6. So, the market shows similar properties to substantial overtrading risk.
However, given the very high observed depths it seems likely that this overtrading risk
is not found by traders to be overwhelming.
5 Conclusion
Some important ¯xed income futures have a distinctive one-tick pro-rata market mi-
crostructure. Using rich tick-level data from a majority (by traded volume) of futures
markets worldwide, we show that these markets are distinctive with regard to four fea-
tures: a bid-ask spread which very seldom exceeds the price tick size; a pro-rata matching
rule; very high o®ered depths at the quotes; and a high propensity to withdraw o®ers
to trade, i.e. to cancel limit orders.
In a simple and intuitive theoretical model of a one-tick pro-rata market, high o®ered
depths arise due to the submission of oversized limit orders, brought about by a strategic
interaction among liquidity suppliers. Traders cancel the parts of such oversized orders
whose sole purpose is to attract from the pro-rata matching algorithm a greater allocation
of market order °ow. This helps to explain to the very high cancellation rates observed
on our sample markets, where overtrading risk apparently constrains o®ered depths quite
weakly, while nevertheless ensuring a ¯nite equilibrium inside depth at the quotes.
Determining if the interactions described in this paper exclude less-specialized clien-
teles of investors from supplying liquidity at these markets, thereby damaging market
17liquidity, would be an important exercise for future research, and would be of interest
to policymakers and the designers of exchanges.
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A De¯nition of STIRs
Short-term interest rate futures (STIRs) are described in Kuprianov (1986). They are
never settled by delivery of an underlying security. Rather, when a contract's expiry
date is reached, it is settled by the exchange making a ¯nal margin call on traders (`cash
settlement'). The ¯nal settlement price of a futures contract is a linear function of a
¯ltered average { say, Y { of the annualized interest rates o®ered on deposits, by a
representative panel of banks. This is calculated by an independent agency.
Futures contracts are sold in lots. The size of a lot is set by the exchange. In the
case of Eurodollar futures with a maturity of 3 months, the exchange levies by margin
call a cost of $25 per lot for owners of the contract, when Y falls by a basis point.
With this rule, owning a lot is commonly interpreted as being like synthetically
owning a deposit of $1,000,000 at a bank. The reasoning for this is that one basis point
of annualized interest on a principal of $1,000,000 corresponds to $100 per year, or $25
over three months: which, as outlined, is the cost to owners of a lot when Y falls by a
basis point. Table 2 records the nominal values per lot of the STIRs we study here.
B Account of the pro-rata trading algorithm
The pro-rata trading algorithm was introduced at Euronext.li®e in August 1999, to
replace the traditional price-then-time priority algorithm on some of its markets. The
algorithm determines the exchange's order-matching rules. Thereby, it controls the
time-to-execution of limit orders.
20Contract Unit of Trading (Nominal Contract Size)
Three Month Euro (EU) contract EUR 1,000,000
Three Month Sterling (SS) contract GBP 500,000
Three Month US Dollar (ED) contract USD 1,000,000
Table 2: STIR nominal values.
This account concentrates on the case where a market sale trades with some of the
assembled bids in the order book. The case of a market purchase trading with asks, is
exactly similar. The market sale speci¯es a quantity to be sold. Typically this quantity
is exceeded by the total quantity currently bid. So the issue is as follows: how should
the market sale be allocated?
The order matching algorithm applies commonly-known rules to determine this. Pos-
sibly universally, it imposes the rule that bids can only trade with a market order when
all higher-priced bids have traded. This is known as price priority. (Equally, asks only
trade when all lower-priced asks have traded.) The remaining issue concerns bids at the
same price, and the sequence in which they trade. This is where the pro-rata algorithm
di®ers from the price-time priority algorithm.
In broad terms, a market order is allocated among equally-priced bids in proportion
to the size of those bids. However, because trades can only occur in integer numbers
of lots, there are details around rounding (points 4 and 5 below). An exception is also
made for price-improving bids (point 1).
1. If the bid which raised the best bid to its current level is still unexecuted, it
executes ¯rst. However, there are maximum and minimum limits to its size.
2. The market sale's remaining volume, if any, is allocated to the remaining bids in
proportion to their size. Fractions of a lot a rounded down, unless they are below
1, in which case they are rounded up to 1.
3. If this results in exactly the right number of lots being traded, the algorithm ends.
4. If this results in fewer lots being allocated than the market order speci¯es, the
remainder lots are allocated to the largest bid. Time priority is enforced in the
event a tie-break, where the largest orders are equally sized.
215. If this results in more lots being allocated than the market order speci¯es, lots
are withheld from the smallest orders. Time priority is enforced in the event a
tie-break, where small orders are equally sized (e.g. size 1).
To clarify this further, I work through some examples. In all the examples: The bid
which raised the best bid to its current level has already executed. Consequently, it is
out of the picture. The total o®ered volume is 80 lots. A market order arrives, requiring
8 lots.
Example 1 : Two bids at the same price. Bid A : 50 lots. Bid B : 30 lots.
A market order for 8 lots arrives. This is fully executed with A and B. Bid A gets a
quantity of 50/80 * 8 = 5 lots. Likewise, Bid B gets a quantity of 3 lots.
Example 2 : Two bids at the same price. Bid A : 51 lots. Bid B : 29 lots.
A market order for 8 lots arrives. Bid A gets a quantity of 51/80 * 8 = 5.1 lots.
Likewise, Bid B gets a quantity of 2.9 lots. However, only whole numbers of lots can be
traded. Point 2 applies. So Bid A gets 5 lots, and Bid B gets 2 lots. However, only 7 of
the 8 lots ordered have now been traded. Point 4 applies. So, A trades 6 lots.
Example 3 : Four bids at the same price. Bid A : 51 lots. Bid B : 27 lots. Bid C : 1
lot. Bid D : 1 lot, and D arrived before C.
A market order for 8 lots arrives. Bid A is allocated a quantity of 51/80 * 8 = 5.1
lots. Likewise, Bid B gets a quantity of 2.7 lots. Bids C and D are allocated 0.1 lots.
Only whole numbers of lots can get traded. Point 2a applies. So Bid A gets allocated 5
lots, and Bid B gets 2 lots. Finally, Bids C and D get 1 lot. However, 9 lots have been
allocated, but only 8 lots are required by the market sale. Point 5 applies. So a lot is
withheld from the smaller of C and D. But, C and D are of the same size, so the lot is
withheld from C.
22C Proof of Proposition 4.2
When M > D, so that there is a very large trade, (fi¡S¤)
@fi
@Qi is equal to (Qi¡S¤). This
is invariant to Q¡i. On the other hand, when M · D matters are more complicated:
(fi ¡ S
¤)
@fi
@Qi
=
µ
QiM
D
¡ S
¤
¶
Q¡iM
D2 : (10)
Note that this quantity is decreasing in Q¡i. Also note that when M . D is very
close to D but below, then (fi ¡ S¤)
@fi
@Qi is (Qi ¡ S¤)
Q¡i
D , which is less than (Qi ¡ S¤).
Combining these three remarks,
@
@Q¡i
E
·
2(fi ¡ S
¤)
@fi
@Qi
¸
< 0: (11)
Starting from a case where Qi is a best response to Q¡i, a small increase in Q¡i implies
that
E
·
2(fi ¡ S
¤)
@fi
@Qi
¸
< 0; (12)
or
@
@Qi
E
£
(fi ¡ S
¤)
2¤
< 0; (13)
so that to minimize loss, Qi should be raised.
D Proof of Lemma 4.3
Starting from a case where Qi is a best response to Q¡i, consider a small increase in Q¡i
to rQ¡i (where r > 1) and a proportionate increase in Qi to rQi. We will consider the
change in the quantity
rE
·
2(fi ¡ S
¤)
@fi
@Qi
¸
; (14)
which is zero in equilibrium. From (10), we see that whenever M < D, we have that
2r(fi ¡ S¤)
@fi
@Qi is invariant to r. However, when M > D,
2r(fi ¡ S
¤)
@fi
@Qi
rises from 2(Qi ¡ S¤) to 2r(rQi ¡ S¤). Also note that when M . D is very close to D
but below, then 2(fi ¡ S¤)
@fi
@Qi is 2(Qi ¡ S¤)
Q¡i
D , which is less than 2(Qi ¡ S¤). So, the
23rate of change in (14) with a small increase in r is
2(2Qi ¡ S
¤)Pr(M > D) ¡ DfM(D)2(Qi ¡ S
¤)
µ
1 ¡
Q¡i
D
¶
(15)
which is
2(2Qi ¡ S
¤)Pr(M > D) ¡ 2Qi(Qi ¡ S
¤)fM(D) (16)
This is positive if
Pr(M > D)
fM(D)
>
Qi(Qi ¡ S¤)
2Qi ¡ S¤ (17)
We now try to prove the central inequality, (19), given the distribution of M. From
Proposition 4.2, Qi > S¤, so that
Qi(Qi ¡ S¤)
2Qi ¡ S¤ <
Q2
i
Qi
= Qi < D: (18)
So, the inequality follows if for any x (including x = D),
Pr(M > x)
fM(x)
> x; (19)
which is easily proven if Pr(M > x) = 1
x®.
Therefore, when r rises,
@
@Qi
E
£
(fi ¡ S
¤)
2¤
> 0; (20)
and it would be better for player i to reduce Qi. Thus ^ Q(rQ¡i) < r ^ Q(Q¡i) for small r
and the lemma follows.
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Figure 3: These histograms are derived by averaging the histogram of inside depths
at the best bid, and the histogram of inside depths at the best ask. Except for the
right-most bin in each histogram, bins are equally sized.
25Histogram of inside depths  - 10-yr US Treasury Bond
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Figure 4: These histograms are derived by averaging the histogram of inside depths
at the best bid, and the histogram of inside depths at the best ask. Except for the
right-most bin in each histogram, bins are equally sized.
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